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1 Introduction
An  understandable  reaction  to  the  predictive
processing framework (PP) is to think that it is
too ambitious (Hohwy this collection). My sug-
gestion  in  this  commentary is  the opposite.  I
will argue that PP can be fruitfully applied to
areas of inquiry that have so far received little,
if  any,  attention  from the  proponents  of  PP.
Perhaps we can extend the explanandum even
further than Andy Clark has recommended. 
There is a certain rhetorical danger to the
position I am urging. One should not oversell
one’s case. I hope to avoid this danger by being
clear upfront that my goal is not to convince
the skeptic of the attraction of PP. I cannot im-
prove on Clark (and others, see below) in that
regard. Instead, I investigate the following ques-
tion: if some version of PP (again, see below) is
true, then what are the larger implications for
human self-understanding?  My answer  to this
question covers three topics. First I will engage
with Clark’s discussion of perceptual processing
from sections 1 and 2.1 of his article. There I
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will sketch how PP’s reversal of the traditional
model of perceptual processing may have signi-
ficant implications for the way in which we un-
derstand perceptual content, which is a core is-
sue  in  the  philosophy  of  psychology.  In  the
second section  I  will  turn  to  another  area  of
philosophical  concern:  consciousness.  Historic-
ally, consciousness research has had a rocky re-
lationship with the sciences of the mind. I hope
to point towards the possibility of a rapproche-
ment. In the final section of the commentary, I
will quickly touch on some practical matters. If
PP  is  true,  then  there  are  important  con-
sequences  for  the  way in  which  we  approach
topics in education, public policy, and social in-
teraction.
My goal  is  to  indicate  possible  areas  in
which  Clark’s  article  (and  related  themes)
might serve as a foundation for future directions
of  research.  My  main  claims  are  as  follows,
numbered according to each section:
1. PP urges an organism-relative conception of
perceptual content.
2. Historical  a priori accounts of the structure
of  perceptual  experience  converge  with  res-
ults from PP.
3. There are a number of areas in which PP can
find important practical applications.
Before entering into the specific issues, I should
add a note about what I mean by PP. Here I
am following the general theoretical framework
expressed in Clark’s article as well as in a num-
ber of  other  publications (Clark 2013;  Hohwy
2013). The approach has a number of intellec-
tual  roots,  including  Hermann von  Helmholtz
(1867) and  Richard Gregory (1980). The main
contemporary  expression  of  PP  perhaps  owes
the most to Karl Friston (2005, 2008, 2010) and
his collaborators, also with important develop-
ments of the generative model by Geoffrey Hin-
ton (2007). By referring to PP as one general
framework, I do not mean to imply that there
are  no  outstanding  issues  of  disagreement  or
open questions within PP. As Clark indicates,
citing  Spratling (2013), there are a number of
options being developed as to the specific imple-
mentation of PP. Also, in the philosophical lit-
erature  there  is  an  emerging  question  about
whether to understand PP as internalist or ex-
ternalist regarding the vehicles of mental states
(Hohwy 2014)—I take  no  position  either  way
here, but see footnote  2. Overall,  my remarks
are motivated by Clark’s exposition of PP, but
they should be applicable to other approaches
and interpretations as well.
2 A new conception of perceptual content
Clark has emphasized the way in which PP de-
parts from the standard picture in perceptual
psychology,  and  from  David Marr’s  (1982)
model of visual processing in particular (pp. 1–
5). According to the standard account, the flow
of  information  is  “bottom-up,”  as  perceptual
systems  construct  increasingly  sophisticated
representations based on the information trans-
duced at the periphery. According to PP, per-
ception involves the active prediction of the up-
coming  sensory  input,  “top-down.”  Deviation
from what is predicted, known as the prediction
error,  propagates  upwards  through  the  hier-
archy until it is explained away by the Bayesian
generative model. 
Now I would like to add that the standard
picture  in  perceptual  psychology  has  been
widely regarded as complementary to the stand-
ard picture in the philosophy of perception (see
Tye 2000, for example). One central question in
the  philosophy of  perception  is  the  following:
what is  the  content of  perceptual  states?  Or,
what does perception  represent? The standard
answer, in tune with Marr’s approach, is that
perceptual systems represent the external world,
more or less as it really is. As Marr puts it, the
purpose of vision is “to know what is where by
looking”  (1982).  This  way  of  thinking  about
perceptual content is almost a commonplace in
the philosophical literature (Lewis 1980, p. 239;
Fodor 1987, Ch. 4; Dretske 1995, Ch. 1). Kath-
leen Akins has described how the orthodox con-
ception regards the senses as “servile” in that
they  report  on  the  environmental  stimulus
“without  fiction  or  embellishment”  (1996,  pp.
350–351).
Since PP overturns the reigning model in
perceptual  psychology,  one  might  now  ask
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whether it also overturns the reigning model in
the philosophy of perception. Here are two ini-
tial reasons to think that it does. First, accord-
ing to PP, there is always an active contribution
from the organism, or at least from a part of
the  organism.  Perceptual  states  are  generated
internally and spontaneously by the ongoing dy-
namics  of  the  generative  model.  Those  states
are  constrained by perceptual sampling of  the
world, not driven by input from the world. Per-
ceptual  states  are  driven  by  the  endogenous
activity  of  the  predictive  brain.  The  relevant
causal history of these states begins, if you will,
within the brain, rather than from the outside.
Each organism’s generative model is unique in
that  it  has been formed and continuously re-
vised according to the particular trajectory of
that organism’s cycle of action and perception.
As Clark himself  puts it,  the forward flow of
sensory information is always “relative to spe-
cific  predictions”  (p.  6).  These  considerations
make it clear that there can be variation in per-
ceptual content for identical environmental con-
ditions.  Perceivers  with  different  histories  will
have  different  predictions  (Madary 2013,  pp.
342–345).  The degree  of  variation  is  an  open
question,  but  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  vari-
ation. 
A second reason to think that PP motiv-
ates a richer conception of perceptual content is
that perception, according to PP, is not simply
in the service of informing the organism “what
is where.” One main feature of PP is that per-
ception and action work together in the service
of  minimizing  prediction  error.  Clark explains
that in “active inference […] the agent moves its
sensors in ways that amount to actively seeking
or  generating  the  sensory  consequences  that
they […] expect” (2013, p. 6, also see his discus-
sion on page 16). If this is right, then percep-
tion does not serve the purpose of  simply re-
porting  on  the  state  of  the  environment.  In-
stead,  perception  is  guided  by  expectation.
While the received view of perceptual content
answers the question of  “what is  out there?”,
PP  suggests  that  perceptual  content  answers
the  question  of  “is  this  what  I  expected  and
tested via active inference?” In a way, PP sim-
plifies perceptual content by replacing the goal
of representing the world with the single guid-
ing principle of error minimization. 
These two points suggest an understand-
ing of perceptual content as something that is
deeply informed by the specific history and em-
bodiment of the organism. The content of per-
ception is a complex interplay between particu-
lar organisms and their particular environments.
At least on the face of it, this way of consider-
ing perception suggests new challenges and in-
teresting new theoretical options for philosoph-
ers interested in describing perceptual content.
For  one  thing,  it  suggests  that  propositional
content  as  expressed  using  natural  language
(Searle 1983,  p.  40)  may be ill-suited for  the
task of  describing perceptual  content.  Natural
language  does  not  typically  include  reports
about prediction-error minimization, nor does it
capture the  fine-grained differences in  percep-
tual content that will arise due to slight vari-
ations in the predictions made by different or-
ganisms. The traditional account of perceptual
content, following Marr, does not include such
differences,  and is thus better disposed to ex-
pression using natural language.
These  new  challenges  for  understanding
perceptual content may offer at the same time a
general lesson for understanding all mental con-
tent in a naturalistic manner. Let me explain.
One of the main goals in the philosophy of psy-
chology has been to naturalize intentionality, to
give an account of the content of mental states
in terms of the natural sciences (in non-mental-
istic  terms).  Well-known  attempts  include
causal  co-variation  (Fodor 1987,  Ch.  4)  and
teleosemantics  (Millikan 1984,  2004).  All  at-
tempts  have  met  with  compelling  counter-
examples.1 Importantly, one implicit presupposi-
tion in the debate is that mental content should
be conceived along the lines of the traditional
view of perceptual content sketched above. That
is, mental states are thought to be about bits of
the objective world considered independently of
the  particular  organism  who  possesses  those
mental states. To use a standard example, my
belief  that there is  milk in  the refrigerator  is
true if and only if there is milk in the refriger-
1 For an overview of the major theories and their challenges, see Jacob
(2010, section 9) and the references therein.
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ator. This belief is about bits of the objective
world: milk and the refrigerator in particular.
Nothing else about my mind is deemed relevant
for understanding the content of that belief. To
use the familiar phrase, beliefs have a mind-to-
world direction of fit (based on Anscombe 1957,
§32). 
If my reading of PP is right, and percep-
tual  content turns out to be a matter  of  the
complex  interaction  between  particular  organ-
isms and their environments, then the comfort-
able  pre-theoretical  mind/world  distinction
might  need  revision.2 Recall  the  discussion
above, in which I claimed that, on the new PP-
inspired understanding of perception the ques-
tion is about whether sensory stimulation fulfils
the  expectations  of  particular  organisms.  All
perceptual states are thereby colored, as it were,
by  the  mental  lives  of  the  organisms  having
those  states.  Organisms  are  not  interested  in
what the world is like. Organisms are interested
in sustaining their integrity and physical exist-
ence; they are interested in what the world is
like  relative to their own particular sensorimo-
tor  trajectory  through  the  world,  a  trajectory
that  is  partly  determined  by their  phenotype
(Friston et al. 2006). This refashioning of  the
mind/world relationship is unorthodox, but it is
hardly new. Similar ideas can be found in  von
Uexküll’s  Umwelt (1934),  Merleau-Ponty’s  dis-
cussion  of  sensory  stimuli  (1962,  p.  79),  Mil-
likan’s “pushmi-pullyu” representations (1995),
Akins’  narcissistic  sensory  systems  (1996),
Clark’s earlier work (1997, Ch. 1), and in Met-
zinger’s ego tunnel (2009, pp. 8–9).
Now return to the problem of naturalizing
intentionality.  If  we  replace  the  notion  of  a
purely  world-directed  mental  state  with  a
world-relative-to-the-organism-directed  mental
state,  then  naturalizing  intentionality  must
somehow incorporate  the relationship between
2 One possibility here has been explored recently by Karl Friston using
the concept of a Markov blanket, which produces a kind of partition
between information states.  As I read Friston, he advocates a plural-
ism about Markov blankets.  On this view, there is not one boundary
between mind and world, but instead there are a number of salient
boundaries  within,  and  perhaps  around,  living  organisms.  Friston
writes that “ . . . a system can have a multitude of partitions and
Markov blankets . . . the Markov blanket of an animal encloses the
Markov blankets  of  its  organs,  which enclose  Markov blankets  of
cells, which enclose Markov blankets of nuclei . . .” (2013, p. 10).
the organism and its world. One way to pursue
this project is to make it a matter of biology
and  physics.  All  living  organisms  keep  them-
selves far from thermodynamic equilibrium by
continuously  exchanging  matter  and  energy
with their environment (Haynie 2008). Perhaps
intentionality can be recast in terms of the or-
ganism’s ongoing struggle to maintain itself as a
living entity. This line of thought is central to
the  enactivist  “sense-making”  of  Maturana,
Varela,  and  Thompson  (Maturana &  Varela
1980;  Thompson 2007).  Crucially,  it  is  also  a
central feature of Friston’s version of PP. Ac-
cording  to  Friston,  prediction  error  minimiza-
tion is a kind of functional description for the
physical  process  of  the  organism’s  minimizing
free energy in  its  effort  to  maintain  itself  far
from thermodynamic equilibrium (2013). Natur-
alizing intentionality may be just a matter of
physics (see Dixon et al. 2014 for an implement-
ation of this strategy for problem-solving tasks).
Before  moving  on  to  the next  section,  I
should add two qualifications. First, the idea of
perceptual content being partly determined by
the  particular  history  of  the  perceiver  should
not be misunderstood as some kind of radical
relativism  with  regard  to  perceptual  content.
Even if perceptual content is  partly determined
by the details of the organism, it is also partly
determined by the world itself. As proponents of
PP frequently claim, our generative models mir-
ror the causal  structure of  the world (Hohwy
2013, Ch. 1). The point I am emphasizing here
is that the causal structure of the world that is
extracted is a structure relative to the embodi-
ment (see  Clark this collection,  section 2.4)—
and perceptual  history—of  the  perceiver.  The
causal  structure  mirrored  by  a  chimpanzee’s
generative model is, in important ways, unlike
the causal structure mirrored by that of a cat-
fish.
The second  qualification  has  to  do  with
my remark that naturalizing intentionality may
be just a matter of physics. Even if one allows
that the approach I sketched shows promise, it
is important to emphasize the explanatory gulf
that remains. The intentionality-as-physics ap-
proach  might  succeed  in  explaining  a  bac-
terium’s  intentional  directedness  towards  a
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sugar gradient (Thompson 2007, p. 74–75), but
it is far from clear how it would apply to my
belief that P—say, for example, that California
Chrome won the Kentucky Derby in 2014. 
The  main  argument  of  this  section  has
been  that  PP  motivates  an  understanding  of
perceptual content that is always organism-rel-
ative. Clark’s version of PP, while not in con-
flict with this idea, has not addressed it expli-
citly, especially as it relates to the philosophy of
perception. My goal here has been to do just
that.
3 Consciousness
In this section I would like to consider how con-
scious experience might relate to the PP frame-
work.  In  particular,  I  suggest  that  there  is  a
convergence  between  a  priori descriptions  of
consciousness, on one hand, and the structure of
information processing according to PP on the
other.3 I will not remark on the way in which
PP  relates  to  some  well-known  issues  in  the
study of consciousness, such as the hard prob-
lem or the explanatory gap. It is not clear to me
that  PP  has  anything  new  to  contribute  to
these topics. Nor will I make any claims about
which  existing  theories  of  the  neural  basis  of
consciousness fit best with PP, although I sus-
pect there is some interesting work there to be
done.
My main concern here is in the  structure
of conscious experience, of visual experience in
particular. Here I adopt a strategy recommen-
ded  by  Thomas Nagel (1974),  and  David
Chalmers (1996, pp. 224–225). Nagel puts the
idea nicely,  “[…]  structural  features  of  percep-
tion might be more accessible to objective de-
scription, even though something would be left
out” (1974, p. 449, cited in Chalmers 1996, pp.
382 f.). The strategy has been implemented, in
fact, using Marr’s theory of vision—the theory
that, as Clark puts it, PP turns upside down.
Ray Jackendoff (1987, p. 178) and  Jesse Prinz
(2012, p. 52) have both emphasized the struc-
tural  similarities  between  conscious  visual  ex-
perience  and  Marr’s  2.5  dimensional  sketch.
3 For a theoretical treatment of the functional significance of this con-
vergence, see Metzinger & Gallese (2003).
Visual phenomenology is not a flat two-dimen-
sional  surface,  because  we  see  depth.  But
neither is visual phenomenology fully three-di-
mensional,  because  we  cannot  see  the  hidden
sides of objects. Marr’s 2.5 dimensional repres-
entation captures the level in-between two and
three dimensional representation that seems to
correspond to our visual phenomenology; it cap-
tures  Hume’s insight that visual experience is
perspectival: “The table, which we see, seems to
diminish,  as  we  remove  farther  from  it  […]”
(1993, p. 104). 
As  Hume  emphasized  the  perspectival
nature of visual experience, Kant famously em-
phasized the temporal nature of experience in
the second section of the Transcendental Aes-
thetic:  “Time  is  a  necessary  representation
(Vorstellung),  which lays at the foundation of
all intuitions” (1781/1887/1998, A31). In an el-
egant synthesis of these two features of visual
experience, Edmund Husserl suggested that the
general structure of visual experience is one of
anticipation and fulfillment:
Every percept, and every perceptual con-
text,  reveals  itself,  on  closer  analysis,  as
made up of components which are to be
understood  as  ranged  under  two  stand-
points of intention and (actual or possible)
fulfillment. (Logical Investigation, VI §10
1900, Findlay trans., 1970)
In  this  passage  from  his  early  work,  Husserl
writes  of  “intention  and  fulfillment,”  but  he
later  replaced  “intention”  with  “anticipation”
when dealing with perception.4 
The main point is  fairly straightforward:
we perceive properties by implicitly anticipating
how  the  appearances  of  those  properties  will
4 When first developing the framework, he used the more general term
“intention” because he was dealing with linguistic meaning, not per-
ception.  When applying the framework to perception one can be
more precise about the nature of the empty perceptual intentions:
they  are  anticipatory.  In  his  later  work,  his Analyses  of  Passive
Synthesis from the 1920s,  Husserl ties in perceptual intentions with
his work on time consciousness (1969) and refers to them as proten-
tions (Protentionen; Husserl 1966, p. 7).  In the same work, he refers
to perceptual protentions as anticipations (Erwartungen, 1966, p. 13,
and antizipiert, 1966, p. 7).  See Madary (2012a) for a discussion of
how Husserl’s framework can be situated relative to contemporary
philosophy of perception.  Also see Bernet et al. (1993, p. 128) and
Hopp (2011).
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change as we move (or  as  the objects  move).
Husserl’s  proposal  accommodates  the  per-
spectival character of experience because it ad-
dresses the question of how we perceive object-
ive properties despite being constrained to one
perspective at a time. And it accommodates the
temporal nature of experience because anticipa-
tion is always future-directed.
Here is not the place to enter into the de-
tails of the thesis that the general structure of
conscious experience is one of anticipation and
fulfillment (see my  2013 for some of these de-
tails), but I should add one more point. As both
Husserl (1973,  p.  294)  and  Daniel Dennett
(1991, Ch. 3) have noted, peripheral vision is
highly indeterminate.5 Also, as we explore our
environment we experience a continuous trade
off between determinacy and indeterminacy. As
I  lean in  for a closer  look at one object,  the
other objects in my visual field fade into inde-
terminacy. In order to account for this feature
of experience, we can note that visual anticipa-
tions have various degrees of determinacy.6
Now let us return to PP. If Hume provides
the philosophy of perception for Marr’s theory
of vision, then Husserl provides the philosophy
of perception for PP. The structural similarities
should be apparent. The predictive brain under-
lies the essentially anticipatory structure of per-
ceptual awareness. Degrees of determinacy are
encoded probabilistically in our generative mod-
els  (Clark 2013;  Madary 2012b).  Action  and
perception are tightly linked (Clark this collec-
tion, p. 9) as self-generated movements stir up
new perceptual anticipations.
Many  readers  will  see  a  connection
between  the  thesis  of  anticipation  and  fulfill-
ment, on one hand, and the sensorimotor ap-
proach  to  perception  (O’Regan &  Noë 2001;
Noë 2004) on the other. Overall, there is signi-
ficant  thematic  overlap  between  the  two
(Madary 2012a, p. 149). As Seth (2014) has ar-
gued, many of the central claims of the sensor-
imotor approach can be incorporated into the
PP framework.7 This synthesis offers impressive
explanatory power, bringing the standard sen-
sorimotor  experimental  evidence  (reversing
5 For impressive empirical work on this theme, see Freeman & Simon-
celli (2011).
goggles, change blindness, selective rearing) to-
gether with the theoretical neuroscience of PP.
The explanatory power is even more impressive
if  I  am  correct  that  PP  reflects  the  general
structure of visual phenomenology, where pre-
dictive processing corresponds to perceptual an-
ticipations and probabilistic coding corresponds
to experienced indeterminacy.
4 Applied cognitive neuroscience
I  would  like  to  begin  this  section  with  some
general comments about new opportunities for
human self-understanding, about extending the
explanandum.  Academic  disciplines  are  stand-
ardly divided into the sciences and the humanit-
ies, and some have expressed discomfort about
the distance between the two modes of inquiry,
or  between  the  two cultures,  as  Snow (1959)
famously  put  it  (also  see  Brockman 1996).
There is an immediate appeal to Metzinger’s as-
sertion  that  “Epistemic  progress  in  the  real
world is something that is achieved by all dis-
ciplines  together”  (2003,  p.  4).  If  my  claims
from the previous section are on the right track,
then we have a convergence of results between
the two independent modes of inquiry, between
the empirical sciences and the humanities. It is
tempting to hope that this convergence signals
the beginning of a rapprochement between the
sciences and the humanities. Perhaps we are at
the  threshold  of  a  new  science  of  the  mind
(Rowlands 2010),  a  science that finds natural
and fruitful connections with the world of hu-
man experience. In this section, I will explore
possible  connections  with  education,  public
policy, and social interaction.
Clark makes two main claims in the final
sections of his article that serve for the basis of
my comments here. First, he suggests that PP
motivates  an  understanding  of  cognitive  pro-
cessing as “maximally context sensitive” (p. 16),
which follows from the property of PP systems
being highly flexible in setting precision weight-
ings for the incoming prediction errors. Flexibil-
ity in weighting precision enables flexibility in
the  deployment  of  processing  resources.  Thus
there  may  be  a  wide  variety  of  cognitive
strategies at our disposal, with a continuous in-
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terplay  between  more  costly  and  less  costly
strategies. Second, he addresses the challenge of
explaining why humans have unique  cognitive
powers unavailable to non-human animals who
have the same fundamental PP architecture. In
response to this challenge, Clark suggests that
our abilities may be due to our patterns of so-
cial interaction as well as our construction of ar-
tifacts  and  “designer  environments”  (p.  19).
Taken together, these two claims can be used to
inform practical decisions in a number of ways.
Begin with education. Educational psycho-
logy is a broad and important area of research.
PP suggests  new ways of  approaching human
learning, ways that might depart from the re-
ceived views that have guided educational psy-
chology. I cannot begin to engage with this huge
issue here, but I would like to offer one quick
example.  One fairly  well-known application of
educational psychology is in the concept of scaf-
folded learning, which is built on work by Lev
Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner. As it is used now,
scaffolded  learning involves  providing  the stu-
dent with helpful aids at particular stages of the
learning process. These aids could include hav-
ing a teacher present to give helpful hints, work-
ing in  small  groups,  and various artifacts  de-
signed with the intention of anticipating stages
at  which  the  student  will  need  help,  such  as
visual aids, models, or tools. Clark himself men-
tions the abacus,  which is  central  example of
scaffolded learning (p. 19). More generally, scaf-
folded  learning  is  a  good  example  of  what
Richard Menary has  called  “cognitive
practices,” which he defines as “manipulations
of an external representation to complete a cog-
nitive task” (2010, p. 238). 
If  PP is  right,  then the learning process
could be optimized by designing environments
in order to provide the cycle of action and per-
ception with precisely controlled feedback (pre-
diction  error).  With  the  growing  commercial
availability  of  immersive  virtual  reality  equip-
ment, educators could design learning environ-
ments (or help students design their own envir-
onments) without the messy constraints of the
physical  world.  PP may give  us  a  framework
with  which  to  understand—and  predict—the
detailed bodily movements of subjects as they
attempt to minimize their own prediction error.
Using  this  framework,  we can design  systems
that  would  optimize  skill  acquisition  by  effi-
ciently predicting the errors that learners will
make. This method could be fruitfully applied
in  the  abstract  (mathematics),  the  concrete
(skiing),  and  in-between  (foreign  languages).
Along these lines, the insights of PP, together
with emerging technology, can lead to powerful
new educational techniques.
Psychology is also applied in some areas of
public  policy.  Clark  mentions  that  PP  chal-
lenges Kahneman’s well-known model of human
thinking as consisting of a fast automatic sys-
tem and a slower deliberative system (p. 18).
Kahneman’s model has been applied as a basis
for influential recommendations about laws and
public  policy  in  the  United States  (Thaler &
Sunstein 2008;  Sunstein 2014). If PP homes in
on a more accurate model of the thinking pro-
cess, then we ought to use it, rather than (or as
a complement to?) the dual systems model as a
basis for policy making. Clark’s interpretation
of PP suggests that we have a highly flexible
range  of  cognitive  systems,  not  limited  to
Kahneman’s two.
For  example,  one  application  of  Kahne-
man’s  model  might  involve  the installation  of
environmental elements meant to appeal to the
fast thinking system, to “nudge” agents towards
making decisions in their best interest. If Clark
is correct, we might consider even more sophist-
icated environmental features that have the goal
of helping agents to deploy their range of cog-
nitive strategies more efficiently. Clark’s ideas of
context  sensitivity  and  designer  environments
are  both  relevant  here.  As  a  society  we may
wish somehow to create environments and con-
texts that take advantage of the large repertoire
of cognitive strategies available to us, according
to Clark’s version of PP (see Levy 2012, for ex-
ample).
The final topic I’d like to mention in this
section  is  what  is  best  described  in  general
terms as social interaction. I mean to indicate a
number of related topics here, but the main is-
sue is how PP might relate to the well-known
philosophical topic of the way in which we un-
derstand and explain our behavior to one an-
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other.  Recall,  for  instance,  Donald Davidson’s
(1963) claim that our explanation of our beha-
vior in terms of reasons is a kind of causal ex-
planation—reasons as causes. On his influential
view,  the  connection  between  reason  and  ac-
tions is a causal connection. In contrast, recall
Paul Churchland’s envisioning of the golden age
of psychology in which we dispose of folk psy-
chological reason-giving in favor of more precise
neurophysiological  explanations  of  behavior
(1981).  According  to  Churchland’s  radical  al-
ternative, the causes of actions are not reasons
as  expressed  using  natural  language.  Instead,
our actions are caused by patterns of neurons
firing,  patterns  that  can  be  described  using
mathematical tools such as a multidimensional
state  space.  In  opposition  to  Churchland’s
grand vision, we have Jerry Fodor’s claim that
the realization of such a vision would be “the
greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history
of our species” (1987, p. xii). Is PP the begin-
ning  of  Churchland’s  grand  vision  coming  to
pass? Is a great intellectual catastrophe loom-
ing? 
On one hand,  PP seems like an obvious
departure from folk psychology: Try explaining
your X-ing to someone by claiming that you X-
ed in order to minimize prediction error!  One
big issue here will be the way in which we think
about agency itself.  It  seems mistaken to say
that  minimizing  prediction  error  is  something
done by an agent. Such a process seems to be
better described as occurring sub-personally. On
the other hand, it is not inconceivable that pro-
positional attitudes can capture the dynamics of
prediction  error  minimization  on  a  suitably
coarse-grained  level,  perhaps  along  the  lines
suggested  using  symbolic  dynamics  (Dale &
Spivey 2005;  Atmanspacher &  beim Graben
2007; Spivey 2007, Ch. 10). I suggest that these
fascinating issues warrant further investigation.
In particular, further investigation ought to in-
corporate  Clark’s  ideas  of  maximal  context
sensitivity and the importance of designer envir-
onments. 
The  way  in  which  we  understand  each
other’s  behavior  is  also  directly  relevant  for
moral responsibility. Following Peter Strawson’s
seminal  “Freedom and Resentment”  (1962),
philosophers have started thinking about moral
responsibility in terms of our reactions to one
another,  reactions  that  involve  holding  each
other accountable. On one influential view, we
hold each other accountable when our actions
issue from our own reasons-responsive mechan-
isms (Fischer &  Ravizza 1998). On a more re-
cent proposal, holding each other accountable is
best modeled as a kind of conversation (McK-
enna 2012). These proposals depend, in import-
ant ways, on assumptions about human psycho-
logy. In particular, they depend on our practice
of giving reasons for behavior. As PP suggests a
new fundamental underlying principle of beha-
vior,  our  practices  of  holding  each  other  ac-
countable may be approached from a new per-
spective. The new challenge in this area will be
to reconcile (if possible) the practice of giving
reasons, on one hand, with PP’s account of be-
havior  in  terms  of  error  minimization  on  the
other. 
5 Conclusion 
The main theme of my commentary might ap-
pear to be driven by an overexcited optimism
for  the  new  theory.  To  be  clear,  I  have  not
claimed that PP is correct. Even its main pro-
ponents are quick to point out that important
open  issues  remain.  My  claim  is  that  it  is
worthwhile to consider the full implications of
PP, given the convincing evidence presented so
far. In this commentary, I have tried to suggest
some of the implications that have not yet been
mentioned—implications for perceptual content,
consciousness,  and  applied  cognitive  neuros-
cience. These implications can be summarized
as follows:
1. PP urges an organism-relative conception of
perceptual content.
2. Historical  a priori accounts of the structure
of  perceptual  experience  converge  with res-
ults from PP.
3. There are a number of areas in which PP can
find important practical applications.
The final  section includes some challenges for
future research. The main challenge is one that
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has  been  familiar  in  one  form or  another  for
several decades in the philosophy of mind. This
challenge is to address the tension between the
way in which we understand and explain our
behavior using natural language, on one hand,
and our best  theory of  human behavior  from
cognitive neuroscience, which, arguably, is PP,
on the other hand. In closing I should note that
even if key elements of PP are eventually rejec-
ted, it might still turn out that our best model
of the mind supports some of the themes I have
been discussing.
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